

Supreme Soviet Investigation of the 1991 Coup

The Suppressed Transcripts: Part 1

Hearings “Concerning the Role of Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991”

Editor’s Introduction

The August 1991 coup attempt against Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev prompted a brief flurry of public outrage against the revanchist elements involved, and particularly against the KGB state security organs. In the wake of the coup, five separate groups—a USSR Supreme Soviet commission, a Russian Supreme Soviet commission, a Russian state commission, an internal Defense Ministry inspection, and an internal KGB group—investigated the individuals and organizations involved. Four of the five conducted their probes in secret. The sole public investigation was that of the Russian Supreme Soviet Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the August Putsch, led by Lev Ponomarev, a reformist lawmaker and co-chairman of the Democratic Russia Movement.

The Ponomarev Commission’s stunning public hearings were well covered by the Russian press, yet until now its complete transcripts have not been generally available. When the commission began delving into how the Communist Party and KGB privatized large amounts of property to their leaders and favored individuals, and laundered or otherwise smuggled fortunes in money, property, gold, and other treasure in the waning days of the Soviet regime, President Boris Yeltsin’s foreign intelligence chief Yevgeny Primakov prevailed on Supreme Soviet Chairman Ruslan Khasbulatov to shut down the investigation. Khasbulatov complied, and the transcripts were never officially published.

Demokratizatsiya has obtained copies of the transcripts, and will serialize sections of them over the next year. The hearings, held in late 1991 and early 1992, consist of five parts: (1) an executive summary with the commission’s conclusions and recommendations; (2) hearings on the Communist Party’s structure and activity; (3) hearings on the role of the repressive organs, particularly the KGB; (4) hearings on the financial dealings of the Communist Party, including money laundering; and (5) hearings on the participation of the armed forces in the coup attempt.

The pages that follow contain two portions of the suppressed transcripts: the executive summary, conclusions, and recommendations; and excerpts of the 4 February 1992 hearings on the repressive organs. The hearings include the testimony of two leading internal security figures: Sergei Stepashin and Viktor Barannikov.

After the 1991 putsch, Stepashin, a career political officer in the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD), served simultaneously as chairman of the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security, head of the Russian State Commission to Investigate the Security Organs, and deputy chairman of the KGB responsible for the St. Petersburg region. Barannikov, a Yeltsin crony who was Russian minister of internal affairs, went on to become chief of the re-organized KGB internal security organs, the Ministry of Security. At the time of the hearings, Barannikov was security minister

and Stepashin was one of his deputies, in addition to being chairman of the Supreme Soviet committee responsible for oversight of the security services.

The Ponomarev Commission's conclusions lay blame unequivocally on the Communist Party and its officials for having plundered Russia of its economic, political, and social well-being. While these conclusions are nothing new four years after the fact, they are quite jarring in retrospect when one considers that the ruling class blamed for Russia's sorry state in 1991 has managed by 1995 to regain power through the expanding post-Soviet state bureaucracy, the KGB successor services, and the privatized sector that was built, in large part, by the very party officials who did the plundering.

The Ponomarev Commission recommended that the federal Russian government document and hold responsible those who committed crimes as Communist Party officials, and that the government take measures to develop civil institutions and processes to check future abuses of state power, such as establishing civil controls and oversight of completely new (as opposed to re-named) security and law enforcement services. These recommendations give one pause. President Yeltsin, parliament, and Western countries—particularly the United States—attempting to aid Russia's democratic transition, ignored these public recommendations. Indeed, as new studies are beginning to show, U.S. aid has actually benefited the individuals and institutions the Supreme Soviet had termed most dangerous to reform, and has severely harmed the cause of reformers like Lev Ponomarev and his colleagues who conducted the investigation.

Stepashin's comments indicting the state security organs for plotting repressions in Lithuania and the August 1991 state of emergency "on the pretext of maintaining order" are almost surreal. In the autumn of 1994, Stepashin, then chief of Russian state security and a leader of Yeltsin's so-called "Party of War," was one of the principal plotters and executors of the armed provocations against the breakaway region of Chechnya, to provide a pretext for the December invasion—in the name of restoring "order" and "rule of law." Stepashin was forced to resign in disgrace in June 1995. (Yeltsin fired Barannikov two years earlier for political disloyalty and corruption.)

The hearing sections that follow the list of individuals and glossary were translated from photocopies of the original typed draft transcripts by Supreme Soviet stenographers. The stenographers used manual typewriters with worn-out ribbons, resulting in text that did not copy well. Parts of the text are illegible. As drafts, the text quality is uneven, as moderators ask witnesses to hurry, or as streams of consciousness result in abandonment of syntax. The translation is tight, often stilted, to preserve accuracy over style. Sections concerning procedural questions that offer no historical insights have been deleted here in the interests of brevity. All editing is indicated in the text. Deleted text is marked by ellipses. Supreme Soviet transcribers' marks appear in parentheses, while the translator's and editor's marks are shown in brackets.

J. MICHAEL WALLER
EXECUTIVE EDITOR
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Main Individuals Referenced in this Testimony

Bakatin, Vadim V. Barannikov, Viktor P.	Chairman, USSR KGB (August-November 1991). RSFSR Minister of Internal Affairs (1989-1991); Minister of Security (1991-1993).
Gorbachev, Mikhail S.	General Secretary, Soviet Communist Party Central Committee, and President of the USSR.
Grachev, Pavel Ivanenko, Viktor	Russian Federation Minister of Defense. Chairman, RSFSR KGB (1991); Chairman, Federal Security Agency (1991); Deputy Minister of Security (1991-1992).
Khasbulatov, Ruslan	Chairman, RSFSR/Russian Federation Supreme Soviet.
Kotenkov, Alexander A. Kozyrev, N. K. Kryuchkov, Vladimir	Deputy Chairman of Stepashin Commission. Deputy Minister of Social Welfare. Chairman, USSR KGB (1988-1991); leader of August 1991 coup attempt.
Kuznetsov, Nikolai N.	KGB officer; Russian Supreme Soviet deputy and member of Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security; member of state Stepashin Commission.
Lisov, Yevgeny K.	Deputy Procurator General, Russian Federation, and Chief, Investigative Group.
Lubenchenko, Konstantin	USSR Supreme Soviet deputy; member of state Stepashin Commission.
Molostvov, Mikhail	Russian Supreme Soviet deputy; former prisoner of conscience.
Oleinikov, Anatoly Polosin, V. Ponomarev, Lev	KGB general; First Deputy Minister of Security. Russian Supreme Soviet deputy. Russian Supreme Soviet deputy; Chairman, Supreme Soviet Commission of Parliamentary Deputies; Chairman, Supreme Soviet Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the August Putsch (<i>referenced as the Ponomarev Commission</i>)
Primakov, Yevgeny	Former member of Gorbachev's presidential council and ranking member of USSR Supreme Soviet; Chairman, KGB First Chief Directorate (October- November 1991); Chairman, Russian External Intelligence Service (December 1991-present).
Stankevich, Sergei B.	USSR Supreme Soviet deputy; member, state Stepashin Commission.
Stepankov, Valentin G.	Prosecutor General of the RSFSR; Russian Supreme Soviet deputy.
Stepashin, Sergei V.	Russian Supreme Soviet deputy; Chairman, Russian Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security (1990-1993); USSR KGB Deputy Chairman responsible for St. Petersburg Oblast (August-November 1991); Chairman, Russian State Commission to Investigate the Security Organs (<i>referenced as the Stepashin Commission</i>), (August- October 1991); Deputy chief of internal security (1993-1994); Director, Federal Security Service/ Federal Counterintelligence Service (1994-1995).

Surkov, Alexei P.	Russian Supreme Soviet deputy; Deputy Chairman of Ponomarev Commission.
Yakunin, Gleb	Russian Supreme Soviet deputy; member, Ponomarev Commission. Former prisoner of conscience.
Yanayev, Gennady I.	Vice President of the USSR; member of Emergency Committee (GKChP) that staged the August coup attempt.
Yeltsin, Boris N.	President of the Russian Federation.

Glossary of Abbreviations

AFB	Federal Security Agency
CC	Central Committee of the CPSU
CD	Chief Directorate (of KGB)
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CPSU	Communist Party of the Soviet Union
DPR	Democratic Party of Russia
FTB	Foreign Trade Bank
GAI	State Automobile Inspectorate (traffic police)
GKChP	State Emergency Committee
Gokhrana	State Repository for Precious Metals
Gosplan	State Planning Committee
GOU	Main Operations Directorate (MoD)
GPU	State Political Directorate
GRU	Main Intelligence Directorate (MoD)
KGB	Committee for State Security
KRG	Committee for Republic Security
MBVD	Ministry of Security and Internal Affairs
MD	Military District
MID	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MO	Ministry of Defense
MVD	Ministry of Internal Affairs
NKVD	People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs
NTO	National-Territorial District
OMON	Special Purpose <i>Militsiya</i> Detachment (MVD)
OVTsS	Department for Foreign Church Operations
PGU	KGB First Chief Directorate (foreign intelligence)
PGU	KGB Fifth Chief Directorate (political control)
RF	Russian Federation
RSFSR	Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic
TO	Territorial District
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
UVD	Directorate of Internal Affairs
UVTsS	Directorate of External Church Liaison
VChK	All-Russian Extraordinary Commission (Cheka)
VPK	Military-Industrial Complex

What follow are the texts of 1) the Supreme Soviet commission Executive Summary, 2) Conclusions from the 4 February 1992 hearings on the role of the former KGB in the 1991 coup attempt, and 3) excerpts of the hearing transcripts.

Executive Summary

Appeal to the President of the RSFSR

from the participants in the parliamentary hearings concerning the role of organizational structures of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union [CPSU] and the Communist Party [CP] of Russia in the putsch of 19-21 August 1991.

22 October 1991

In the course of the hearings, it was established that the organizations which call themselves the RSFSR CP and the CPSU, as organizations, having substituted themselves for the organs legally elected by the people and having usurped state power, and as organizations having prepared an anti-constitutional putsch in August 1991, bear direct responsibility to the people for the very severe economic, political, social, and national crisis in the country.

On the basis of the above, we appeal to the President of the RSFSR with the following proposals:

- On the basis of Article 7 of the RSFSR Constitution, take steps to forbid the activity of the RSFSR CP and the CPSU on the territory of the RSFSR [based on the fact that they are] organizations which participated in the forcible overthrow of the constitutional structure of the RSFSR, undermining its security and inciting social and national strife;
- Dissolve the organizational structures of the RSFSR CP and also the structures of the CPSU located on the territory of the RSFSR;
- Ensure that citizens of the RSFSR are immune to being held liable based on the [sole] fact of their membership in the CPSU and the CP, RSFSR;
- Present to the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR in the form of a legislative initiative, a draft law concerning the property of the RSFSR CP and the CPSU.

Conclusions

resulting from the open parliamentary hearings concerning the role of repressive organs of the former USSR in preparing for and conducting the putsch in the USSR.

4 February 1992

The participants in the open parliamentary hearings “concerning the role of repressive organs of the former USSR in preparing for and conducting the putsch in August 1992 [sic],” having heard testimony and evidence from People’s Deputies of the Russian Federation, responsible authorities, experts, members of the commissions for investigating the events connected with the putsch, and based on analysis of numerous documents of contemporary correspondence and that obtained in the archives of the CPSU Central Committee [CC] and the Committee for State Security [KGB], USSR, constitute:

- The leadership of the KGB, USSR, beginning in 1987, when the situation in the country dictated the necessity of beginning reconstruction of all state systems, made a political decision to steadily undermine the course of *perestroika*, and to return to the norms of totalitarian rule and the suppression of democracy;

- Former Chairman of the KGB, USSR, V. A. Kryuchkov, steadfastly took the line of disinformation toward the President of the USSR, the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the government, and the public about the situation in the country, actively egging on the authorities against the strengthening forces of democracy, inciting them [the authorities] to forceful pressure against [the forces of democracy];

- The intensity of the active preparation of organs of state security for introducing the emergency situation in the country increased since the middle of 1990, when several special forces [*spetsnaz*] divisions were placed under the authority of the KGB from the Ministry of Defense. Intensifying the ideological indoctrination of the personnel of the special services, the essence of which amounted to the necessity of strict compliance with the orders of senior leaders and the instructions of the leadership structure of the CPSU CC, the principle of the superiority of law was set aside.

- Preparation of concrete measures for conducting the putsch was begun in the KGB in December, 1990. From this time, there has been increased surveillance of the more active figures in the democratic leadership, steps have been taken to discredit them. The intensity of the directed disinformation at home and abroad has increased constantly. The special services have been conducting training to capture the most important buildings of state power in Moscow, Leningrad, and other cities, and to arrest the leadership and the most visible figures in the RSFSR. All KGB subunits were used to fulfill these tasks, including the Chief Directorate for Foreign Intelligence (PGU);

- The KGB leadership headed by V. A. Kryuchkov played the most active role in the direct implementation of the steps of 19-21 August 1991, with the intent of forcibly returning the state to a totalitarian regime, and to establish mass terror and wide-scale repression in the country.

The main reasons that the KGB leaders were among the basic ideologues (together with the CPSU leadership) and the executives of the anti-constitutional putsch are included in the following:

- Throughout the history of the Soviet states the organs of state security (from the VChK [Cheka] to the USSR KGB) have played the role of the main repressive structure of the totalitarian regime, and were a weapon of genocide against their own people, [and were] directly responsible for massive crimes against humanity;
- From the very beginning the executive of the will exclusively of the CP leadership, accustomed to ignoring society's laws, the state security organs became an independent political force in the CPSU and the state and turned into a super-governmental institution;
- The wide-scale conduct of such steps to prepare for the putsch, as well as the whole history of illegal acts by the state security organs attests to the absence of any sort of parliamentary or government control over them. The process of reforming the new structures of state security essentially have been placed today in the hands of the special services themselves, who have not held back from attempts to control society.

The participants in the open parliamentary hearings—people's deputies and representatives of society—appeal to the RF Supreme Soviet and to the RF President with the following proposals:

- Immediately start preparing a draft law about the use of international legal standards of public organizations for dealing in our country with the crimes against humanity and genocide which were committed in our country by the Communist regime;
- Organize in concert with leading republic and foreign specialists a careful investigation of the activities of the VChK-KGB for the entire period of its existence, [an investigation] which would publish a "white book" for the first time in our country's history;
- Take under active control the process of forming special services in the country. In the framework of an *ad hoc* commission of the Presidium of the RF Supreme Soviet for control of the forming of special services, by 15 February this year, start checking the steps taken by the special services to monitor telephone conversations, and the legality of this;
- Develop and adopt a law guaranteeing an active and independent mechanism for control, primarily parliamentary control, over the activities of all special services, including foreign intelligence;
- With the intent of preventing misuse of the state security organs in unconstitutional and illegal activities, accelerate the development and adoption of a package of laws regulating their activity. Consider as expedient the mandatory implementation of the orders of the President of Russia (as a temporary step until the appropriate laws are passed) as a package of normative acts regulating the operational investigative activity and other types of special service activity;
- When manning the state security organs and intelligence, free them from persons who were allowed to ignore the laws as they carried out their service obligations. Recognize as expedient naming civilians to leadership positions of independent authorities;

- [As part of] the task of immediately ridding society of repressive institutions and their traces, the issue of covert agents of the former KGB must be placed on the agenda. Understanding (but not over-emphasizing) the complexity of this problem and at the same time the unacceptability of allowing those people who secretly cooperated with the organs of repression to remain in responsible positions, including in the corps of [people's] deputies, it is essential to start studying this matter with the intent of developing an appropriate law about forthrightness, and to ask the committees about legislation, human rights, and security of the RF Supreme Soviet;

- Adopt a law permitting a citizen to have access to his dossier in the former KGB;

- Make public (with publication in the mass media) material of the investigations of the reasons for and conditions of the putsch, such as were done by the commissions of the USSR Supreme Soviet and those of the Russian Federation, and also by the commissions for investigating the participation in the putsch of the KGB and the USSR armed forces.

Chairman of the Commission

People's Deputy of the Russian Federation

[signed] L. A. Ponomarev.

Transcript

Meeting of the Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the August Putsch on the Subject: "Concerning the Role of Repressive Organs in the Putsch of 19-21 August 1991"

4 February 1992

Chairman: L. A. Ponomarev

L. A. Ponomarev

... By authorization of the President of the Russian Federation, the Commission for Investigating the Causes and Circumstances of the Putsch of 19-21 August today is conducting open parliamentary hearings on this matter. These are the second parliamentary hearings which our commission has held. The first hearings concerned the role of the organizational structures of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in preparing for and conducting the coup. Today's hearings are connected with the role of the repressive organs, also in preparing for and conducting the coup of 19-21 August.

The need for these hearings is connected with a natural stage of the work of our commission, but also because this is the first time we will bring this matter to open hearings.

I wish to remind you that our commission is not the only one which has worked on this matter. Also working on this matter was the state commission headed by RSFSR People's Deputy Sergei Vadimovich Stepashin, who is sitting next to me, and who is the Chairman of the RSFSR Committee on Security. There was a commission of the USSR Supreme Soviet headed by former USSR People's Deputy Abolensky, and there were also internal commissions of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and the armed forces. Unfortunately, for various reasons, including objective ones perhaps, not once were the results of the work of these commissions made public. I think that these, our parliamentary hearings, possibly are the first ones openly to discuss the matters which are, perhaps, of primary importance to the states.

Furthermore, we know that the fate of the security of Russia and the status of these services has undergone quite sweeping changes over the course of these five months which have passed since the time of the putsch. The name of these services has been changed at least three times, and their structure was also changed. This also brings some element of non-specificity to the work of these services and can be a point of discussion at our parliamentary hearings. Specifically, this is the status of the special services at present and in the future.

I think these words will suffice for the beginning of the work of these hearings. I want to acquaint you with the order of work of parliamentary hearings. We will have testimony by invited responsible state figures and from experts. If someone besides the People's Deputies wants to ask questions, then give me a note in written form and, depending on the necessity, I will ask that question in the name of the person who signed the note.

Allow me to begin the hearings with the testimony of Sergei Vadimovich Stepashin, the Chairman of the State Commission, the Chairman of the Russian Federation Committee on Security, and the Deputy Minister of Security. Please.

S. V. Stepashin

After such an introduction, it will be quite difficult to speak. People's Deputy Ponomarev quite correctly said that the problem connected with the activity of the former organs of the KGB was looked at by several commissions. Concerning the history of the creation and funding of our commission and its results, I will speak further in connection with the fact that in principle it was correctly said that the results of our commission were not publicized, or, to speak more exactly, were not made public. This is only partly correct, because the results of the work of our state commission were given in a detailed report to former USSR President Gorbachev. This commission was created by a decree of that same Gorbachev with the agreement of B. N. Yeltsin. Furthermore, the conclusions of our commission were distributed to the individuals in charge of all the former union republics, now the countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). And in connection with the fact that I, furthermore, am still a member of the parliamentary commission headed by our distinguished colleague Ponomarev, we are presenting the conclusions of our commission to this parliamentary commission.

That's why its results were not published completely, although in the course of the commission's work we gave several interviews and spoke in the mass media or on Russian television and in other mass information media. This was brought about by the fact that in the documents of our commission many names were mentioned, and there were many conclusions—we will call them preliminary conclusions—and we did not have the role of an accusatory organ. You all know that. This was also connected with the fact that the investigation was in progress, as you know. But that is now completed and the accused are acquainting themselves with the conclusions which were presented to them, and there was a request from the Russian Federation Prosecutor General Stepankov that if possible we would not make any preliminary conclusions about specific people, since this might interfere with the investigation. I think that all sitting here understand what caused this request.

But whatever happened in connection with the fact that today we have parliamentary hearings, I am allowing myself to briefly provide you with the conclusion which was prepared by our commission. I will speak in more detail about the conclusions under which it worked and its procedures and what its intent was and how many of the aims and tasks of this commission were achieved.

Immediately after the events of 19-20-21 August after the putsch, or more exactly after the coup d'état against President Yeltsin and President Gorbachev, and also with the then newly appointed Chairman of the KGB Bakatin, who is present here, a state commission was established by order of the USSR President. Its task was to investigate the activities of the organs of the KGB. Members of this state commission included a group of USSR People's Deputies (that is, the former USSR), and of the Russian Federation. I was named chairman of this commission. I will name the

members of the commission for the journalists and mass media. The Deputy Chairman of our commission was Kotenkov; Bezrukov was the commission member specializing in legislative matters; other members included Kuznetsov and USSR People's Deputies Academician Yu. Ryzhov, K. Lubenchenko, and S. Stankevich. Also included in this commission were representatives of former authorities, including the KGB and RSFSR AFB, including the present First Deputy Minister of Security of Russia, Oleinikov, and the former General Director of the AFB, Ivanenko. This was roughly the makeup of our commission.

Furthermore, we were given the right during the work of this commission to use quite a large group of experts, and this was done. We used jurists and former employees of the KGB, representatives of the public, etc.

I want to say right away that the course of the work of the state commission and its work was regulated by presidential decree. One of our regulations was that we were given the right to study and get acquainted with all the documents located both in the archives and outside the archives of the KGB. We had no obstacles in studying these documents and in meeting with people, including several who were being investigated. Furthermore, through my personal request, the Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation made it possible for us to acquaint ourselves also with the documents which today apparently will figure in the course of the investigation, the famous "Boldin's safe," where were locked the very spicy, I have to say, documents connected with the personal instructions by Kryuchkov for monitoring several state figures of the former USSR and of our republic.

Why do I speak of this? Not to in some way excite interest in these documents, but so that it would be exact and clear to all present here in the hall that there were no obstacles to the work of the commission from the point of view of concealing documents or not delivering documents to us, and so on. That is, the mode for work of the commission was created quite well.

The one thing I wanted to say (because I ran into this as did Comrade Bakatin when he took up the post of KGB Chairman) is that, unfortunately, quite a large part of the documents were destroyed on the day when, and after the end of the unsuccessful coup, the Lubyanka [KGB headquarters] was stormed, and particularly when the statue of Felix Dzerzhinsky was toppled on Dzerzhinsky Square, now Lubyanka [Square]. At that time, motivated by the fact that the former USSR KGB building might be taken, by instruction of the leadership of the [KGB], the command was issued to destroy a number of documents, the majority of which, at least in part, concerned the involvement of the KGB in the events of 19-21 August, and a number of other documents. Therefore, in the course of this commission's work, we had to fill in some blanks, some nuances of the activity of the [KGB] on 19-21 August by interrogating witnesses from among the former KGB employees, and so on.

Keep that in mind also when we talk about the course of the work of our commission. This is the prehistory and the history of the work of our commission. I already said how it accomplished its work, and I tried to clarify why some documents and its conclusions were not published completely.

In connection with the fact that so many documents and questions connected with the activity of the KGB in the course of the August events and the days preceding it were already made public, somehow there was a leak of the conclusion of the authority's [i.e., the KGB's] commission headed by Comrade Oleinikov, and all of its conclusions were published in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, and there was a leak of several other documents connected with the activities of the parliamentary commission, too, including the work of our commission. Therefore, many questions were posed today about the commission's conclusions. These are well known, so I will allow myself to skip reading the conclusions of our state commission in full, but I will mention the basic problems. If there are questions, I will answer them.

Concerning the conclusions of our state commission, the first and main conclusion is this. In the events connected with 19-21 August, the leadership of the KGB, its former leadership headed by Kryuchkov, played one of the leading roles. That is the first and main conclusion we made, based on the documents and affidavits which we were able to obtain in the two-month course of the commission's work.

The second conclusion of the state commission is that everything that was connected with the events of 19-21 August had been prepared at least as early as the fall of 1990. At least, variations in the theoretical light were played out; the introduction of an emergency situation; it was all worked out in theory. Furthermore, from history we know now very well, from the history of the former USSR, we know that they employed practical variations for establishing the emergency situation. We all know about the year-long duration of events in Lithuania, the establishment essentially of an emergency situation during the Congress of People's Deputies here in Moscow. All this was initiated by the former leadership of the KGB, on the pretext of maintaining order in the country.

By the way, the former Chief of the KGB himself, Kryuchkov, did not deny this. It would have been very hard to deny it, because there are affidavits about it and documents of various kinds, which confirm the participation of Group Alfa [of the KGB Seventh Directorate] in the taking of the State House in Lithuania and the resultant casualties. [Group Alfa] later was located not far from the White House [Russian parliament building]. This is the second conclusion which our state commission came to.

The third conclusion is that the former KGB leadership quite often during the course of the system's functioning violated not only the generally accepted standards of the USSR Constitution, and not only the general human standards generally accepted, but also its own orders and instructions. There is talk here of the system of overt, covert, and technical control (or oversight, if you prefer), actually control over a quite large group of citizens of the Russian Federation and of the former USSR, including Russian Federation People's Deputies, and including state leaders during that period. We received documents showing that technical control [electronic surveillance] was conducted against the present leadership of Russia—I have in mind here Yeltsin and Khasbulatov, and a quite large group of Russian People's Deputies. What is most startling is that even during the course of the August events, such a role of technical control was effected against several members of the Emergency Committee (GKChP), including

such as [Gennady] Yanayev and [Anatoly] Lukyanov, that is, Kryuchkov to some extent didn't trust even *them*.

This conclusion also was made by the state commission. We are well aware that this is not only a civil crime but a federal crime as well. Keep this in mind, too.

The next conclusion of our state commission is that the former Fifth [Chief] Directorate, or the former Directorate "Z" and a number of other of the KGB services, in force, as I understand it (and when we had a quite lengthy meeting about this subject with the President of the former USSR M. S. Gorbachev, we became convinced of it), apparently, coming from the social laws which were given to the whole leadership of the KGB, provided a significant level of disinformation to the former leadership of the former USSR. [This was] in many areas, in the social arena in the country and the political and about the situation in the armed forces. We examined hundreds of documents which were sent directly to M. S. Gorbachev and other government and state leaders, including [leaders of] the Russian Federation, in which clearly there was expressed the single idea that without introducing emergency measures, without introducing semi-military, without strengthening the role of the army and the special services, it would be impossible to maintain order in the country, and that there is an enemy in the form of destructive forces (by these it was understood the whole democratic society, including the former leadership of the Supreme Soviet Presidium and the present leadership of the Russian Federation). Hundreds of such documents were sent to Gorbachev, and he had formed, as I understand it, and part of the leadership of the country had formed quite professionally the position that it would be impossible to avoid [disaster] without these measures.

Moreover, in such situations as in Lithuania, there simply was pure disinformation, including about those events which took place a year ago during the storming of the Government Building. This, naturally, does not forgive the human guilt of the former leadership, since certainly in that situation it was necessary to look into it and to know what is going on in the country, but nevertheless, such activity took place and it took place quite intentionally.

Furthermore, in connection with the fact that we took a very close look at the former Fifth [Chief] Directorate, now these facts are known, and moreover the parliamentary committee (People's Deputy G. Yakunin and People's Deputy V. Polosin) have already given regular information to the mass media, and very active work was done among the public from the point of view of agent work, and active work was done among the clergy in this area, and so on. I will allow myself not to speak further on this subject, but many documents were published in the media. Therefore, this very conclusion was made by our state commission, and we made our ideas known to the appropriate leaders and the country, including to our parliamentary commission.

And the last conclusion which was made, if we speak of the basic conclusions of the state commission, concerned the direct course of the August events (and I would divide them into several stages). In essence, all documents pertaining to the decision to establish the Emergency Committee and to declare a state of emergency were prepared as early as 4 August,

when several conditions and variations of declaring the emergency situation were promulgated, and the appropriate documents were prepared.

Much has already been written and said about the events of 19-21 August themselves, and I won't bother repeating them, so as not to take up your time. The KGB leadership, unquestionably, and the former leadership of the Ministry of Defense played one and the same main role. And this was the possibility of detaining Russian President Yeltsin. There were several variations. The first variation, you know that a plane was to be landed at Chkalovsky [airfield in Moscow] and there Yeltsin was to be arrested. The second variation was to take him at his dacha. The third variation was to take him while he was at the House of Soviets.

It is hard to say today what is connected with what, but none of these actions was taken.

After the meetings that we had with the former commander of Group Alfa, Karpukhin, and we studied those documents which we could, I say openly that if such a command [to arrest Yeltsin] had been issued, with those three variations the President of Russia could have been arrested without any problem. Unquestionably. But the final order for the arrest was not given by the leadership of the KGB. Nor did the GKChP leadership give it. I suggest that the results and indications of the former accused themselves, because they didn't bring this situation to light, but at least we have to think about this. I speak of this because immediately after the August events in many papers there were various kinds of inexactitudes and incorrectness, that, well, Alfa was late, here it was late, here it slipped up. Believe me, Alfa was a very seriously prepared group, never late anywhere, no slip ups, including the time and place when, well, we here, several of those sitting, defended the White House.

Therefore, keep that in mind when we look at the role, place, and preparation of the former leadership of the committee [for state security] in those events which took place 19, 20, and 21 August.

I suggest this, and our state commission came to this conclusion, especially when we met with the executives to whom the command was given to detain several People's Deputies. By the way, a list of about 40 persons was prepared, and they were supposed to be detained during the first day of the state of emergency. We did not find the list itself, as it was destroyed, but we came upon several names just in the course, so to speak, of those direct meetings with those who had been given the instructions.

Several people were arrested, or, more exactly, detained, including people's deputies, including, as you know, Kamchatov and Urazhtsev. The rest were not detained. And in the course of meetings with the representatives of those to whom the KGB employees were handed over, [we asked] why this didn't take place because the routes, you remember well, and the locations moreover were known, moreover this was done on the night of 18-19 [August], and they knew it. But, judging from everything, and I am talking about what our state commission concluded although you might not agree, judging from everything, the majority of the workers, and not only the rank-and-file workers of the KGB, and it is important to note as a matter of principle, simply sabotaged some orders and instructions. That is, the people understood and felt that there would be no success in this putsch, no real results of this putsch, even if it managed to destroy the government.

Therefore, there were elements, such Italian [-style] strikes or such small sabotage if you prefer, when many things just fell by the wayside.

Well, you know all this, including about the direct events connected with blockading the White House and storming it. I will not repeat it. And those depositions which we took from the leader of Group Alfa and from those members of Group Alfa, were sent to a special group of people's deputies, and that material which we managed to obtain shows that actually the instruction and the order to storm the White House were not given out.

Karpukhin and a number of representatives of the armed forces and the internal troops were ordered to reconnoiter around the White House and clarify possible approach routes. But you know that at that time several tens of thousands of people were located here, and it was clear that it would be impossible to take the White House by storm without thousands of casualties from the peaceful civilian population. Although from a military point of view, technically it could be done, and Karpukhin talks about this quite explicitly for about 20-30 minutes. But at least such a command was not forthcoming. The reason I am talking about this in detail is to remove some type of slander and speculation concerning the events of those three days because already many books of memoirs have come out—artistic, publicistic, and others—about these events, and several people who were nowhere near the White House are writing, and, well, to Hell with them.

That's why I am speaking in some detail about these days. From one side and the other, so that it would be understood that the former leadership of the KGB did not occupy the last place and the last role in organizing all these events connected with the 19th, 20th, and 21st.

The second thing, which is also very important and principled, and I will talk about it in less detail, but I have to talk about it, is that we set ourselves a very difficult task to study how in the outlying areas the territorial organs of the KGB of the Russian Federation and the USSR acted in this or that event in August and leading up to August. Commissions with a charter quite like that of our state commission were set up in most of the oblasts, raions, and republics of the Russian Federation. But in particular, they were set up in other union republics, and we exchanged opinions.

So I will name just a preliminary figure, after studying that information which we received, and we received information practically from everywhere, the absolute majority of places. About 70 percent of the territorial subdivisions of the KGB in the Russian Federation did not support the GKChP.

You know that on 19 August, the former General Director of the AFB, then the Chairman of the KGB of Russia, Ivanenko, sent a telephone message. It was sent at ten o'clock the morning of 19 August to all territorial organs of the RSFSR KGB and said that they were supposed to implement the instructions and orders of Russian President Yeltsin only. This telephone message went essentially to the majority of the territorial subdivisions. I want to say once again, that our experience and analysis of the documents we checked show that 70 percent of the territorial subdivisions complied with this instruction.

You should understand the situation clearly about what those people said at that time. Then it was not clear on the 19th, so to speak, who would win, and you remember well what happens to officers who do not carry out the instructions of their senior leader, having in mind Army General

Kryuchkov. Somehow the people found the bravery and the civil courage in this situation to make up their own minds. I am speaking especially about this so that those who come behind will come to the main reason, I suppose, for which our commission operated.

That means, concerning the RSFSR KGB, because today there are very many questions, particularly in connection with those reorganizations which have taken place recently in the security organs. That means we have to note that during the events of August, essentially, the RSFSR KGB as such did not exist. There was KGB leadership. Ivanenko was designated as the Chairman of the KGB. He had several deputies and a staff of 25 persons, because you know that after signing the protocol between Kryuchkov and Yeltsin on 5 May concerning the creation of the RSFSR KGB, the former leadership of the USSR KGB, including former USSR President Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, took no action about the situation, and did not make it possible for us to create a complete special service in the RSFSR.

Therefore, to speak about the place, role, and participation at that time of the RSFSR KGB is quite difficult. I want to provide for you two examples. I have in mind the instruction of Ivanenko and how the territorial organs reacted to it concerning the situation connected with the events in August and the action of the territorial organs during the August events and the events leading up to August.

And, finally, about our commission's main task that was assigned us.

Accusations and conclusions about accusations are done by the Prosecutor. We had created, and correctly so, and I will come back to this, the Obolensky parliamentary commission and the RSFSR parliamentary commission and there still will be some commissions set up, since there was no commission in Russia anyway, but we have before the main targets and tasks nonetheless, to find the guilty and the culprits, I say once more, this isn't so hard to do today. These lists were prepared and 32 officers and general officers of the KGB, about whom Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov will speak, by today have been cashiered, and these were the ones who mediated or even were active in the events of August 1991. But we placed before ourselves one of the main tasks concerning the future of the RSFSR special services, as well as those of the USSR, but now we will just talk about the Russian Federation.

In general, this was a very difficult and hard task, and today it is still too early to say if we completed it successfully. I will speak only of some stages which, so to speak, we went through in the course of the state commission's work.

At the suggestion of the state committee and with the agreement of the then leadership of the KGB, that is, of Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin, immediately after the August events, you know, KGB control was terminated over those very repressive organs which could directly participate in military or other actions, and I have in mind here three airborne divisions, which Kryuchkov had put under his own command. They were transferred, including the brigade from Tioply Stan, the best qualified and well trained, and they were transferred to the armed forces of the former USSR.

Furthermore, Group Alfa was transferred from subordination to the former USSR KGB. This was a very well-trained subunit which in general was supposed to be oriented in ideas, by the way, but was trained to work on

this, in some measure on the struggle against terrorism, taking airplanes, and so on. That is, this group was removed from subordination of the USSR KGB.

Furthermore, removed from subordination to the USSR KGB were government communications, and now there has been created the State Committee for Government Communications, which is subordinate directly to the President. It is true, if we speak openly, that this is the theme of a different conversation, and I personally have very serious doubts that our government communications today are under control. And when Comrade Barannikov asks me if we have monitored the phones in the White House, I will answer somewhat openly. Yesterday that question was brought up at the Supreme Soviet Presidium. I, for example, cannot provide assurances of that, even though our government communications are removed from USSR KGB subordination and from the Ministry of Defense. You know that a special independent service has been created now, one like the United States Secret Service, and the former Ninth Directorate, that is, the directorate for protecting the President. It occupies itself directly with protecting highly placed figures of our government. That is, there is such a disbanding, more exactly, yes a disbanding of the KGB from the point of view of removing from its structure those force subunits which could participate directly in such events as took place in August. This was done.

A second group of proposals which the commission prepared, and these have in part been effected even though the disintegration of the USSR did not make it possible to see this through to the end, was the decision to liquidate the USSR KGB, and to create a corresponding special service in the republics. We worked with Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin on the third or fourth day of the commission and conducted a joint meeting with the leaders of all the special services of the former union republics (where, by the way, representatives of the now-independent Baltic states participated) where an agreement in principle was reached that in all of the then sovereign but not independent (independent, that is what our republics quickly became after August, as they were particularly active in not helping us during August, but this is a political matter and not part of a commission's work) . . . but . . . excuse me, an agreement was reached that those independent states and their leaders would form their own special services. But to coordinate their activities . . . Yes, excuse me, intelligence was established separately, but this is a position very much in principle. For coordination of their activities, including intelligence activities and matters of the struggle against terrorism and the war against narcotics there are points of contact through which it is simply impossible *not* to coordinate our efforts, even on a global scale, not to mention the former USSR. We agreed that some sort of interservice committee would be set up, some inter-republic security service. There were many disagreements about this, and many different positions, but, finally, I think we came to a meeting of the minds with former President Gorbachev, and Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin agreed to it, as did Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin. But the disintegration of the USSR did not allow us to get to the point of creating this service. And, by the way, speaking of today, this is a very serious problem. A very serious problem. And now the majority of the former union republics (excluding the Baltics) have a question about the capability of creating some coordination center for matters of security in our interests in the abbreviated, the CIS, because this is objectively necessary

now. And today we will come to this again. these were the concrete recommendations given by our commission.

The next thing that was done was an announcement of the immediate liquidation of those subdivisions which worked on the so-called struggle with ideological dissidents, and so on. This is the notorious former Fifth Directorate, or Directorate Z. It was disbanded at our committee's recommendation and with agreement by Vadim Viktorovich Bakatin and by his order, some three or four days after he got the job. It was disbanded, truly, so to speak, as an organization, but not *de facto*, because the majority of the people who worked in that system are still at their posts, and now more serious organizational reforms are taking place in this area.

And the next task which we set for ourselves, and on this I will finish my presentation, is the development of normative, legal, and legislative documents for forming in principle new special services—services whose task should be designated first of all as defense of people, the Constitution, and the legally elected state institutions of control and economic security, and the sovereignty of the state. Well, these three areas were what we set out as the main direction for the creation and operation of our special services today. For this, the commission made a resolution (we mention again that we attached to ourselves quite a large group of experts) about the adoption of an entire block of legislative acts. You know in the second reading in the near future, a law about security will be adopted. Now the work-up and preparation of a law concerning organs of security and special services and a law about intelligence [are being prepared]. And from the adoption by the Supreme Soviet of these laws, coming from these tasks which the leadership of the country will put before the special services and that objective reality and demand which exists today, in the tasks standing before the special services, they will in the future be formed organizationally. So today, when we talk about today's Ministry of Security, you know that by decree of Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin this ministry was created, and the rules which regulate its activity are called "temporary." Temporary. I will take up those questions possibly which could be placed today before our commission and before the leadership of the Ministry of Security sitting here, about what will be done in the Ministry of Security and why this or that structure is preserved. I say once again, this is a *temporary* regulation. And the structure, functions, and tasks must be determined not by the authority itself and by those people who work for it, but by those legal, normative acts about which I spoke. That's first. And second are the vital tasks and demands which the state faces. That's how it is in all civilized states today.

Thus, these proposals were formulated by our state commission.

Concerning the results of the work, I have already spoken at the beginning of my testimony. We reported this to the leaders of our republic and to President Gorbachev. The conclusions were presented to the parliamentary commission. I already said why a number of documents were not published. I, by the way, today, as you see, tried to avoid naming very many names. I didn't do this now, because the investigation is not finished.

If there are any questions, I am ready to answer them.

L.A. Ponomarev

Thank you, Sergei Vadimovich. People's Deputies, if you have any questions, please. Fourth microphone.

B.G. Kibirev (187th District)

Distinguished Sergei Vadimovich, you said that you cannot guarantee that our phones in the White House and those of high government figures are not monitored. Can you answer the question and guarantee, so to speak, comment about if the phones of People's Deputies in the province and those of other people are monitored?

S.V. Stepashin

Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov is here. I will pass the question to him.

L.A. Ponomarev

Thank you. Third microphone, please.

M.M. Molostvov (Mikhail Mikhailovich)

Sergei Vadimovich, respected Minister and colleague. Here's a question that bothers me. I know that listening . . . excuse me, the monitoring was a constant practice. Sometimes it can yield some useful results. Some number. But here's what really upsets me. It seems to me that before the putsch, the most tragic event was the murder of Alexander Men, the priest. I don't doubt the sincerity and the qualification of the investigation, but I know that it is very difficult to find an end to this difficult matter. At the same time, I am totally convinced in all my experience, and I tell you with all my knowledge, exactly, that it just could not be that the KGB did not hear . . . did not monitor and did not conduct specific surveillance on Men. And as in time the events in Tbilisi could be watched on a movie film taken by KGB workers maybe, I would like to know, are there in our authority any documents connected with Alexander Men or not? That's my question.

S.V. Stepashin

This question was put to me not as the Chairman of the State Commission to Investigate the Activity of the Emergency Committee, but in another are. I suggest, Mikhail Mikhailovich, that we still have many matters, including the events in Lithuania, and that case you mentioned, and it is possible that there are very many others, which must be investigated individually. We have to set up a qualified investigative group made up of workers from the prosecutor's office, and honest and direct employees of the former Committee on Security, the present Ministry of Security. I think that the majority of these people are good people working, particularly, in the provinces. And we have to conduct second, highly qualified investigations. I say once again, many such cases actually exist today, and I am in complete agreement with you. You pose a very correct question.

L.A. Ponomarev

Thank you. Second microphone, please.

Yudin (from Samara)

Sergei Vadimovich, in your testimony you noted that there was this planned disinformation of the President and, in general, of state organs. Now there is a new decree from the RSFSR President (Which changes the previous one) about the creation of a joint ministry from the KGB and MVD. Wasn't this a result of new advisors using the old yardstick? What do you think?

S.V. Stepashin

The question was not addressed.

Yudin

But to whom?

S.V. Stepashin

(Laughter)

Chairman

I request that the questions directed to the Chairman of the State Commission be more appropriate. Fifth microphone.

Luchinsky (Deputy, St. Petersburg)

The press contained information about our Chief of Intelligence, Academician Primakov, stating that since the days when he was a student, he had contacts with state security, not in general, but specifically with that system of state security whose work we are now raking over. I personally in my practice ran up against participation of that same Politburo member, Primakov, for interference in the work of a commission of the First Congress of Union [People's] Deputies in investigating the matter of [Gdlyan]. We all know the results of the action of this commission.

I have three questions. First, had any previous bonds been established between the former organs of state security and the present Chief of Intelligence, Primakov? Second, has any involvement of Primakov with the Emergency Committee been established? Two questions will suffice. Thank you.

S.V. Stepashin

Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov is present here. I suppose that he can answer several questions and alleviate those suspicions which have arisen. But what can I say?

At that time Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov was not assigned to intelligence. So here we made no ties or no bonds. Concerning those documents which we studied, and a great number of documents were examined, including some about the involvement of past and present Politburo members during the time when the party had not been broken up, there was no mention of Primakov's name.

Concerning your second question about indirect or direct, and who was what kind of agent where and so on, I want to say once again that we found no such documents. Moreover, rather than, probably, accusing someone of something, one must present concrete facts because I can, let's say, as the head of the Leningrad Directorate name the Leningrad agents of the KRG.

Try to show that this was not so. Let's work more seriously and in a civilized manner in these questions. And, thus, I, probably, am revealing no secret, and this is strictly professional, so that probably no more of these questions will be forthcoming. Nobody ever writes down names, that name so and so, that so and so is such and such an agent, and so on. There is a specific system of cover names, codes, and so on. So try to figure out who is who.

Chairman

Fourth microphone please.

Benov (Deputy, 18th Tikhoretsky National-Territorial District)

Sergei Vladimirovich [sic], I would like to clarify several nuances about the participation and involvement of the armed forces in developing the plans, as you said, since the Fall of 1990, and who specifically, if the commission knows, cooperated with the KGB in developing the theoretical plans and then, partly, as you said, playing them out during the events both in Moscow and in the Baltics and on 4 August. Or were these plans developed only by the KGB with consideration of the [armed forces] participation or for attracting the armed forces or the Ministry of Defense?

Chairman

Sergei Vadimovich, excuse me, I have to make a correction first. Our commission intends to conduct hearings directed toward investigating the armed forces, but if Sergei Vladimirovich [sic] wants to add something now, then go ahead.

S.V. Stepashin

Yes, the higher leadership was involved. Yazov gave the command to some officers of the General Staff, and it was up to the leadership to prepare plans. On 4 August, such an instruction was given to the former commanding officer of the UVD, General Grachev, but this was not an order to prepare for the State Emergency Situation, but to prepare alternative ways to participate, including using airborne troops, in implementing the Emergency Situation. Grachev did not hide this. He was invited to appear before us at the State Commission, and he said that yes, actually, Yazov has given him such an order, and yes, actually, he had prepared a document concerning the implementation of an emergency situation in the case of exceptional . . . you understand all these positions, and so on.

Concerning the subsequent actions, including those of General Grachev, you know that beginning from the first day, 19 August, he did not support the GKChP and together with Shaposhnikov spoke out against the then leadership of the Ministry of Defense.

Chairman

Thank you. Second microphone, please.

Akhunov (Deputy, Bashkiriya)

Sergei Vadimovich, I have this question. You confirmed that Group Alfa and its leadership did not receive an order to storm the White House. At the same time, I remember well that in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* there were two articles where there was an interview with the leadership of Group Alfa and

it was stated directly that the leader gathered his higher officers of Group Alfa and each independently of one another refused to execute the order. There apparently *was* an order to storm the White House. Whom are we to believe, that which was published in *Literaturnaya Gazeta* or your presentation?

S.V. Stepashin

It's your business whom you believe. I said what I know.

D.S. Bubyakhin (Deputy, 396th District, Vilyuisky)

Tell us, please, Sergei Vadimovich. Some time in November, Kazakhstan President Nazarbayev, speaking on television, said that the negotiations at the Novo-Ogarevo dacha were monitored by organs of the KGB. Now protests from Kryuchkov have appeared in the mass media stating that he contests that, and even will take it to court. It is hard to understand who was right here. This is the first question.

The second question. When comrade Bakatin gave the diagram of monitoring to the American ambassador, the former party *nomenklatura* raised a very strong stink. When he spoke, Comrade Bakatin made it clear that by this he was thawing the last ice of the Cold War. I agree with this opinion. What is your opinion?

S.V. Stepashin

Concerning the first question, it is practically impossible to prove if somebody was listening to somebody at Novo-Ogarevo. You understand well that nobody documents anything, nobody files anything, nobody signs anything, even if he hears something. There is an indirect opinion expressed by former President Mikhail Sergeevich Gorbachev, and later by Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin that very confidential information about what happened in the course of these meetings suddenly came out. What the source was is another question. Now, nobody can prove anything. I say this openly. But you can think whatever you want to about this situation.

Concerning the second question. I say that Comrade Bakatin is present here and he can answer about all the circumstances connected with the transmittal of that technical documentation and methods connected with the embassy that we have here. I do not want to comment on this decision because he is present here. He did this personally and did not coordinate these things with our commission.

Chairman

Please, third microphone.

G.P. Yakunin (Deputy 11th National-Territorial District)

Sergei Vadimovich, you were lucky, and actually I am not being ironic here because our commission was totally unable to tear our way into the holy of holies archives of the CPSU Central Committee's (CC) business (I have in mind here the President's archives), which, according to our circumstantial data, contain very important information about the activity of the CPSU CC and the criminal activity of the Politburo. You also are lucky to get and work with these archives as chairman of the State Commission. You know that there is a chance that our commission will be shut down on

the 15th, and a great deal of pressure [to do so] has been exerted, as we know, on the leadership of the Presidium. So the chances that we will continue this very important and necessary work are none, but the public and even our parliament, certainly, wants to know nevertheless. There can be no genuine democratization and no genuine knowledge of the GKChP unless these archives are opened. As far as I know, the unofficial keeper of the keys, the protector of these archives now is the very capable, very powerful Yuri Petrov, the President's Chief of Administration. We, in general, are unanimous that, judging from your testimony, unanimous on the idea that actually the public should know about everything that took place and the organizations, including our organs of power, should be reorganized.

What do you think should be done at the level of our parliament, what should be done so that there is access to these archives, if not by the rank-and-file of the parliament, at least by your commission, a parliamentary commission?

S.V. Stepashin

Thank you for the question. I will try to answer it in more detail because it sounded uneven concerning access to the archives and other matters which are connected not only with the CPSU CC.

Concerning the archives of the CPSU CC directly, you were mistaken to call me lucky. I did not work on these archives personally. Each member of the commission had a specific function to work on. Another lucky person worked there, Sergei Borisovich Stankevich. So that luck fell upon him, and you should somehow try to find out from him what he saw and heard.

I agree with you on this matter. Yes, actually, if we are to say that we are (and I have in mind the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation and the Congress) the highest organ of power, the representative organ of power, despite all the political changes which took place in our country and in the election of the President. Certainly, there have to be people in this parliament who should be given access to anything, including the most secret, including the archives of which you speak. Besides the archives of the CPSU CC, there are many other things. There are questions and nuances connected with intelligence. By the way, we talked about this with Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov. There are very many questions connected with today's Ministry of Security, and with today's MVD, and with today's Ministry of Defense, and not only with these authorities. There are many problems about which one could speak today, and about which none of us knows anything in principle. I vote only here, and sometimes I don't know for what. Excuse me, I have deviated here.

I think that we should nevertheless go (and I have discussed this with Filatov and Khasbulatov) to a civilized posing of these questions. We would establish a specific group of deputies which [group] should have the right of access to all these things, as is done in other parliaments. But they would have to sign an agreement of non-disclosure of state secrets. There are things which, certainly, the public should know. There are things which you know that in any civilized country, be it the USA or England or Germany or Sweden, etc. should not be revealed. There are things that should be revealed after 40-50 years have elapsed. There should be a special law issued about state secrets and about commercial secrets. I don't want to defend any authority now, neither that which we had nor that which we have

nor that which did not endure from state to state. But on the other hand, I agree with you completely that we have to get rid of a lot of this slander about who is hiding what where. That's the first thing.

Second. I agree here with Boris Nikolayevich Yeltsin when he looked at these documents (you remember he made a slip of the tongue himself about it) and he said, "Take this filth away from me. I don't want to see it." We could say the same thing today. Certain things, probably, which today should be studied and which the people should know, but the dosage to some extent (excuse me, I understand that I will bring criticism upon myself when they talk to me about dosage), but today in this specific situation to splash out all this filth in which we have lived for 73 years, I just don't know how well this would play for stabilizing the situation in our country. Nor into whose mill today this filth should be poured in this specific situation. Although I want to say once again that the people absolutely should know the truth about the situation in which they have been living. And for that we need that civilized path about which I speak, and we need a specific change to the status of the People's Deputy and his legal prerogatives.

To finish off the theme of all these commissions, I want to say that although to some extent some of the danger to distinguished People's Deputy Gleb Yakunin is removed, yesterday the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the Russian Federation (I said myself that we like very much to create commissions and we have done it once again) set up a temporary commission connected with reforms in the activity of the security organs. And then the same kind of commission was set up about the MVD. Members of Parliament will make up the commissions. There will be a commission, as I know it, created about the lines of government structures. We negotiated with Viktor Pavlovich Barannikov that a group of experts also is ready to work with this commission to reform the security organs and to bring them under the direct control and with the direct participation of parliament, including the parliamentary committee, not only on a legal basis, but I have in mind so that they could influence personnel, structural, and functional changes in the activity of this structure. Such a commission is established. Yesterday a resolution of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (and we are deciding on who will man it now, forming up who will be part of it). Well, Lev [Alexandrovich Ponomarev] was present yesterday at the Presidium, and he can now confirm what I am saying.

Chairman

Fifth microphone, please. Lukin.

Lukin (9th National District, Podolsk)

The speaker already partly answered my question. Actually, there is one question in principle it seems to me. Does the distinguished speaker think from the results of the investigation that the corresponding organization now is working under accurate and firm control of the state, public, and political leadership of our country? And if not, what is to be done? You already answered this in part.

S.V. Stepashin

Yes, I answered this in part. I think that this process is only beginning. Now, certainly, no. So we are speaking about parliamentary control,

speaking about a commission, speaking about assigning responsibility. I think that first the present leadership of that authority would be involved.

Chairman

Fourth microphone. Last question.

Zadonsky (34th Territorial District)

Distinguished Sergei Vladimirovich [sic]. I am somewhat embarrassed at your temporary assessment that we lived in some, as was said, "filthy conditions," which should not immediately be poured out, and [the public] should not be informed of them. I have some doubt that we only lived. It seems to me that we are still living under these conditions. In connection with this, I have this question. Just before me a question was asked by parliament member Gleb Yakunin, which, using the results of the investigation that was conducted, provided some information about the methods that the repressive organs used, let's say, or directed the activity of the spiritual leadership. I have this question. Do you think that this was necessary in this delayed manner, as Gleb Pavlovich did, not disclosing the same, since naturally this is a serious question, a question demanding legal investigation. Don't you think that it was that activity, let's say, of public organizations? How many people, approximately, were sent, let's say, as agents to Democratic Russia, and how many agents are located among the ranks of Deputies of Russia, and what methods did the KGB use to influence their activity? If you have such information, don't you think it's possible to provide information about what and how this was done? Naturally, our main task is not only to dig up the past, but to protect ourselves in the future.

S.V. Stepashin

This question is actually rhetorical. I could

S.V. Zadonsky

No, it is very concrete. Do you have any such information at your disposal and do you think it's possible to analyze it in this situation?

S.V. Stepashin

Thank you. The commission could accurately and simply draw a conclusion that the work was done in this way and the information, including that which came from the deputy corps and from public organizations, that there was some active surveillance of some members of Democratic Russia and so on. That is, there certainly was such information. Again I must say that I can't say anything concerning names, that technically, this cannot be done. But in your question is hidden one very large threat. Unfortunately, you did not sense it. I will allow myself to polemicize, since we are all People's Deputies and we have parliamentary reading.

There is a very strong threat. Well, imagine that I had made a slip of the tongue and somewhere I (I am doing that now, but I am doing it in confidence that God will save me if the mass media have not gotten it already) I were to say that about one-third of the People's Deputies are KGB agents, as are the members of the Supreme Soviet. Could we work with one another after that? Each of us would start to look and think, and that one, because look how he looks at me. What would you think of your friends,

comrades, gentlemen and ladies? Let's get away from this. We went through this in 1937. This is a very tenuous thing. That's one thing.

The second thing. Let's talk man to man finally. You understand that we had to have come upon several people who were directly or indirectly paid and unpaid agents of the KGB and so on, and there are some such people in my own native city. Including several people whom I deeply respect . . . let's say respected. You understand that there are situations when a person simply is cornered. Simply cornered. And we have strong, manly people. There is Mikhail Mikhailovich Maslov, who is present here. There is Sergei Adamovich Kovalev, and the deceased Andrei Dmitrievich Sakharov. But the majority of us worked in a unique psychological, social, and political mode. Moreover, I will end my ideas anyway, for many, and if not for many, then in some respects, cooperation with organs of power which embodied at that time the political system is in no way shameful. This was considered completely normal. That's how Pavlik Morozov and so on were raised. In no way do I defend these people, I understand that they brought fire upon themselves. I would be just as happy not to talk about this. But let's think today about each person. Good, let's forget it, and I will caution everyone in this situation since this practically will not be reported. Because it is a very difficult matter. I would answer in this way, although some of my colleagues might not agree with this understanding.

G.I. Zadonsky

I would like to say that I am not satisfied with the answer. I did not receive an answer to my question.

L.A. Ponomarev

Dear colleague, this is not our final speaker. This is an important matter, and you can deal with it later at length without quarreling. Nevertheless, let me allow those who are scheduled to speak, to speak.

N.D. Surkov

Distinguished Sergei Vadimovich, the fact that the question he asked was asked with a different intent is not the issue. I would like you to tell us how many people are following us, watching us, sitting with us. The main thing is that yesterday in our commission meeting about determining the causes of the GKChP, we were informed of a notebook, a top-secret notebook from the PGU concerning how the surveillance was done, literally, against People's Deputies of the [Soviet] Union until 1991.

L.A. Ponomarev

And [People's Deputies of] Russia, of course.

Surkov

Yes, and very often the Republic corps [of deputies] was depicted in very modest terms. Considering that the distinguished Deputy Zadonsky mentioned it, I would like to present the idea that [why he asked it] is not important, but that you should tell us now, first, if there was penetration of Democratic Russia. Second, is there penetration now of the corps of deputies? That's second. And third, since we are now drawing up legislation, we have to say, in consideration of the facts we have today, that

we will enact appropriate standards and include them as impermissible in the law. That is what we are talking about, right? Right, since we will react with normative legislation.

S.V. Stepashin

Thank you. You made my job easier in this situation, as you yourself answered your own questions. Concerning the first and second items, I already said there was [penetration].

L.A. Ponomarev

Thank you, Sergei Vadimovich. Please, Yevgeny Kuzmich Lisov, Deputy Prosecutor General of the Russian Federation Procuracy and Chief of the Investigative Group. Excuse me, I will name the following speaker, so he can get prepared. That will be Minister of Security Barannikov.

Ye. K. Lisov

The investigative group for investigating the conspiracy which took place last August in our country set before itself the intent to determine the criminal and legal aspects of those events. And we initially were interested in matters primarily [to determine] if those events were criminal, who committed the crime, what was the level of involvement of persons who committed crimes, and what was the level of proof against this or that individual who committed a crime.

Certainly, we could not be spared from the fact that investigating these criminal and legal aspects of this crime, we would be unable to avoid political, moral, and ethical aspects of these events. But this was not our primary purpose. Our primary purpose was to answer the question, "Who conspired, and what should he answer for?"

Probably it would be superfluous now to speak in detail about just who did what, as this is already well known and has been published many times. The people who were arrested for committing this crime are known, as are the people who due to some circumstance or another were not arrested or were arrested and later released.

The case, as you know, is being readied for submission to the court and the course of this work is quite difficult because not all of those accused were uniformly aware of what was going on.

But the subject of today's conversation, certainly, leads us to the point about which I will speak in detail, and maybe I will speak in more detail of the role of the KGB as a whole, and the extent that the declaration was formulated, on [the KGB's] leadership, on its employees, and about the implementation of this conspiracy.

I came before this tribunal with a feeling of some relief, since Sergei Vadimovich to a great extent talked about what we had established. I don't want to take up your time with repetition of these circumstances. I just wish to say that I am in complete agreement with the conclusions of the commission, that the KGB leadership was one of the main organizers of this crime. Truly, the preliminary preparation for the conspiracy was begun not in August, but significantly earlier. But all this was camouflaged very deftly as a matter of developing documentation for declaring a state of emergency, and you know that this matter was raised at several levels, in various forums, repeatedly. But the basic documents were all developed in the very

bowels of the KGB and [these documents] later became the basis for the EC's documents. These are Resolutions One and Two of the GKChP, and the appeal to the Soviet people, and the announcement of the Soviet leadership and all the others which are well known.

Certainly, we found in the KGB and in other authorities other documents which carried, perhaps, some secondary, auxiliary character. These documents are contained in the material of the criminal case, and many of them were objects of investigation by the state commission headed by Comrade Stepashin.

I, literally, perhaps schematically, will describe the role of the KGB in the stages which accompanied the conspiracy. Certainly one can say at once that without KGB participation, the conspiracy simply would have been impossible. That is, the KGB leadership and the entire organization—as we know this repressive organization had the basic ideological and consultive and executive and whatever else you like role there. And later on, this was expressed, as I already said, in effecting the period of preparation and in developing the documentation. The organization *per se* of the conspiracy, perhaps, was heard by many, and they know how this took place, and there were meetings at the KGB safe house ABC, where the plan for action was worked out. And this plan of action later really was implemented in the force of those possibilities, such as were proposed by the KGB and other organs. And later on, as Sergei Vadimovich said, in effecting the measures of the conspiracy itself, the KGB's role then also was a leading one. Perhaps, I repeat, in preparation and development of the operation, a list was prepared to isolate the more active enemies of the conspiracy, whomever the GKChP members thought them to be. You know this. This included preparation to storm and capture the House of Soviets and subsequently to liquidate those leaders of Russia who first would provide the most active opposition. This included limiting many other democratic institutions in the course of preparing and conducting the conspiracy, and limiting the role of the press, radio and television and so on.

Considering that there might be some attempts to paint some rumors about my presentation, I want to present one literally very small document, which to some extent can illustrate that which I am saying. This is a document which was discovered in a search of Yanayev's office and it is known with absolute certainty that this document was prepared in the KGB. It is dated 19 August, and, naturally, it is not signed. The title is *About Some Axioms for the Emergency Situation*.

“1. Don't lose the initiative and enter into any sort of negotiations with the public. They often try this in an attempt to preserve the democratic façade, and as a result, the public gradually gets the idea that it is possible to argue with authority, and this is the first step to an ensuing struggle.

“2. Don't allow even the first appearance of disloyalty—meetings, hunger strikes, petitions, or information about them. Otherwise, these will become allowable forms of opposition, after which the more active forms follow. If you want to get by with little bloodshed, put down opposition at the very outset.

“3. Don’t hesitate to move to clearly expressed populism. This is the law for winning the support of the masses. Immediately introduce economic measures understandable to everyone—decreased prices, weakened [controls on] alcohol and the like, and the appearance of at least a limited assortment of goods in high demand. In this situation don’t even think about economic efficiency, of the rate of inflation, or other ramifications.

“4. Don’t waste any time in informing the people about all the details of the crimes of your political enemy. In the first days, [the public] should catch this information. And at that very time you have to engage in a squall of information disclosure, exposing the criminal groups and the syndicates, corruption, and so on. Later on, information about the enemy should be given in an ironic, humorous key, let’s say, about who was governing us. The information, if possible, should be obvious and presented in few words.

“5. Don’t weaken your stick with direct threats. It is better to put out rumors about the toughness of the authorities, about control of discipline in production and in everyday life, and apparently systematic raids on stores, recreational areas, and so on.

“6. Don’t get bogged down with personnel matters and strikes. The people must know who will be punished and for what sins. It must be visible to all who must answer for what, and to whom the population must turn with its problems.”

If you read the GKChP documents well, you easily can see how this was developed and how all this was brought to life in reality. Naturally, other documents were found there. It will take a lot of time to make them public. I have before me such documentation, the tactical development for providing the emergency situation, beginning 20 August. There are sections here. The intent is to take extra steps for correcting tactical areas which were allowed to happen in the period after 0400 hours on 20 August, and the actions to correct errors of the initial period of the introduction of the emergency situation. Who has to do what, how, and so on is all worked out in them.

The KGB not only prepared this in advance, but it quite exactly and deeply analyzed the prognoses, what actions would take place after the conspiracy was put into operation, and in some way it tried to influence the situation in the country.

Telling you all this, I am trying to supplement on this level the testimony of the preceding speaker. I would like to direct your attention to one thing that in my opinion is very important.

The first and general main conclusion is that, as you already understand, per our information, without the KGB playing a starring role, the conspiracy would have been impossible. But now I would like to direct your attention to this. The KGB also did not act individually, alone. We quite accurately identified bonds that had been overlooked between the KGB and, first, the structures such as the CPSU, the armed forces, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, and the military-industrial complex. You can check my words, but when the KGB prepared the documents for implementing the state of emergency, special couriers day and night delivered the documents to Staraya Ploshchad [Old Square, the CPSU CC headquarters], and they

worked on these documents there, giving them a quick editing, and this was joint, unified work. I base this idea on the following. The KGB, as it seems to me, always served not the people, not the public, but a small group of persons. And this small group of persons set up its role in our society. Probably, this will generate questions, and I understand what [the questioners'] animation is about. I am speaking primarily about the Politburo of the CPSU CC. This demands that I say that the intent of the parliamentary hearings, the intent of the commission's work, whatever was done to study the role of the KGB, and our intent, as is the work of the investigative group, is that we should develop a proposal for establishing a mode of operations for the security service so that nobody would ever be able to repeat what happened.

I will say here that this is closer to me, as a prosecutor. We have in each area, in the procuracies of the oblasts special workers, who are called assistant prosecutors for oversight of the results and inquiries about the organs of state security. There is one such worker per oblast, but there is not one in every oblast. But for oversight of the results and inquiries of the MVD organs there are 10, 15, even 20 people. And the volume of work of the KGB or the authorized number of KGB directorates in the oblasts and krais is no less than the MVD, and they do a lot of work there. But the prosecutor's oversight was practically absent. It was absent not only because there were few people, but because the KGB workers to a large extent were directed in their work not by the laws, but by instructions and regulations, and these were secret not only from the public but from the prosecutors.

Our proposal now is that as soon as possible the parliament should make laws regulating the activity of the security service, or external intelligence, and of investigation operations of the activity of all organs, and have them governed by laws. [Then] we could organize oversight to oversee these organs. That's the first thing.

Second. I think that there should be some clearly thought out parliamentary control over the security service. I don't have in mind some *ad hoc* commission to study this or that question; I have in mind a systematic parliamentary control. How would this be expressed? This is more difficult for me to say, as I am not a member of parliament, but nevertheless, I would be so bold as to propose the creation of a special commission, such as Sergei Vladimirovich [sic] described, some special group of lawmakers given special authority, and feeling a great deal of responsibility in this work.

Lev Alexandrovich, if you allow, I am finished.

[Text omitted—Editor]

V.P. Barannikov

Distinguished Chairman, distinguished members of the Supreme Soviet, and People's Deputies. As you know, a qualitatively new management structure has been formed in the system of providing for the security of Russia.

It is the Russian Federation Ministry of Security. The decree of the President of Russia, the temporary regulation about the ministry was published in the press. My task, therefore, is somewhat simplified. I suggest that there is no need to clarify further all of our functions, except that we are

proposing to correct, supplement, and change things and if this were simplified by the adoption of a law about the security of Russia or if conceptually new proposals were made demanding another look at the tasks and functions of the republic's special services, on basic principles and approaches, I would discuss the formation of the new ministry in more detail.

First. We didn't operate in secret, but openly, that is, in preparing the temporary regulation, we actively coordinated with the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security.

Second. I think it most important in the activity of the ministry and subordinate security organs as a whole to have reliable provisions for the defense of the person, his rights, and his freedom so that we could directly come to the realization of the principle, "Government is for the person, and not the other way around."

Third. Together with this, we think it is our main task to defend the constitutional structure, the state's sovereignty, and the territorial integrity of Russia.

Fourth. Another very important direction we anticipate is also the function of complying with the orders of the President and the Supreme Soviet. And while we comply with our instructions, we provide information to the highest state organs, legislative and political powers, we can, in our opinion, facilitate the adoption of optimum political decisions.

We are taking into consideration [the conclusions] made by the parliamentary commission headed by People's Deputy Ponomarev, [and we are] reacting to all its critical notes concerning the use of security organs and personnel in the August events to head the so-called GKChP. [We are also taking into consideration] the conclusion of the Russian Procuracy's investigative organs and the conclusions of our own official investigation. Our course in working with personnel is done in a flexible combination of wisdom and professional experience, and primarily, certainly, instruction of youth.

We want to install the optimum necessary communication between the generations. Nothing positive should be forgotten, while always we should refrain from practicing that which can be seen in things like the testimony today in parliament. In connections with this, we rely on help primarily from the Supreme Soviet. As never before, today the employees of the security organs need a law about the security of Russia, a law about security organs, a law about operations and investigative activity, and a law about responsibility for corruption and other packages of laws. We are in favor of exacting legal organs in the future in anti-constitutional or adventurist aims. Here I want to pause on one problem which directly hampers our activity. Stubbornly spreading clearly overstated rumors about agents has acted as a cause [celebre], serving as a basis for speaking out. Today once again this question stands here, given out, I think, by those testifying.

An attempt was made to groundlessly and flagrantly discredit our official activity, and to hamper placing trust in the security organs. I will name a few figures first. These are statistics according to available archival data for the 1918-1990 period concerning criminal cases investigated during those 72 years by the state security organs. 3,853,900 persons were convicted either judicially or non-judicially. Among these there were a significant number who were employees of the state security of that time. More than 2,558,000 persons now have been rehabilitated, including

1,103,000 persons [who were rehabilitated] in the 1988-1991 period, that is with participation of our contemporary workers in the security organs. During the last 45 years under the framework of existing legislation, precautionary and preventive work was done in relation to some 460,739 citizens who had committed acts constituting a threat to the security interests of the country, the former USSR.

Under such conditions, one can hardly say that so-called total surveillance or voluminous political investigation was conducted.

Yes, we use agents. That is the truth, and it is true that we use them just like any special service in civilized countries. And we will use them in the future, as this is our official duty and official obligation. It is important to describe this activity exactly with law, including provision for guaranteeing the security and defense of the agents themselves and the workers organizing their activity. We count on your support, on the support of parliament, in this matter.

Let me also report to you about the steps we took in connection with the work of the parliamentary commission, the investigation of the prosecutor's group, and our own investigation which we made, concerning the activity of the GKChP.

Besides those who were indicted, 15 higher leaders from the central apparatus of the former KGB were fired. During the last 15 days, I transferred 12 leaders to the reserve, and all of the personnel, by the way, have been removed from the staff of the new ministry. Now each of these individuals is being looked at, but the minister is not hiring them. They are being hired by a panel of 12 persons, leaders, and the matter of their dismissal is being dealt with according to the law. One might ask me if the basis of our approach is the principle of presumption of innocence for resolving the cases of people who worked with good will within the framework of the law at that time. It is. Such people were only suspended and an objective evaluation provides the defense of their rights and freedoms as citizens. Our approach was confirmed recently by the fact that the Russian Procuracy told us that they were dropping criminal charges against a number of workers of the former KGB because there was no evidence of their having conspired to seize power.

If, during the course of further investigations, evidence becomes available which would interfere with personnel of any rank fulfilling their duties in the security organ system, then appropriate measures will be taken. As the minister, I say here in the hearings that this work is being done decisively and firmly. In conclusion, the leaders of the ministry think that the Ministry of Security itself should accomplish its duties within the framework of its competence under strict parliamentary control. By the way, today a matter was correctly raised in the testimony concerning that it is essential to put an end to the former lack of control once and for all, and strict parliamentary control is required. When I was given a hearing about the temporary regulation at the Committee on Defense and Security, I raised this question, that there were to be no secrets kept from that parliamentary group which would be set up with official access in accordance with the law. And there will be no secrets. It would have to have access to all activity of the security service, just as the case in any civilized country in the world today. By decree of the President, our ministry, together with the Ministry of Justice, is tasked to present within a six-month period a proposal about

suggesting changes or supplements to the Russian legislation about the security of security organs. I already heard here, and this was discussed yesterday at the Presidium, that the Presidium had looked at this matter and a commission was set up which today would help the leadership of the ministry to develop comprehensive activity in forming and establishing the ministry. I think that such a decision was made only yesterday at the Presidium and it will help not only in establishing the ministry, but in preparing the legislative basis for oversight of it at the meeting of the Supreme Soviet. Only under these conditions, I think, will our ministry occupy a worthy place in the law enforcement system of the security of Russia. Thank you for your attention. I am ready to answer questions concerning the activity of the ministry.

Chairman

Please, fourth microphone.

Kibirev (178th District)

Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, I would like to readdress to you my question which Sergei Vladimirovich [sic] did not answer. Is there now any monitoring of the telephones of the higher leadership of the country in the White House? Is there a practice of monitoring the telephones of deputies and other persons in the outlying areas? What can you say about this matter?

V.P. Barannikov

First, I want to say that this entire system now has been handed over to the President. I also transferred a group of employees. I do not agree with this. I do not agree as a professional and as a specialist, because there should be parliamentary control, and there should be exact, firm, specific organizational control covered by law. Therefore, a group of specialists today in the Ministry of Security is preparing specific proposals on this matter. I think that the commission which the Supreme Soviet Presidium created yesterday will be provided with this material by us, and we will decide, based on this material, to appeal to the President.

But I am telling you directly that here, I repeat once again, we need an exact law. An exact law is needed. I said that we do not have such a service. Therefore, I can not control that which I do not have. You understand this very well.

Chairman

Please, third microphone.

G. P. Yakunin

Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, a decree of the President was published concerning the temporary regulation of this authority which you head. This causes great alarm, particularly on the part of Democratic Russia, because there is potential danger for the growth of this authority and the rebirth once more of such activity as was done by the Fifth Directorate, Directorate Z. That is, control of the whole spiritual life of our society. And we, certainly, think that it is correct that in a democratic state such a law should be written specifically by the Supreme Soviet and not by presidential

command. Are you prepared to place this matter before the Supreme Soviet so that as soon as possible this regulation will truly turn out to be temporary and to have the Supreme Soviet as quickly as possible develop a new basic position for the work of your authority under democratic conditions?

This is the first question. Answer this one and, if possible, I will ask another.

V.P. Barannikov

I repeat once again that I say only thank you, as the leader of the newly constituted ministry, to that commission which was named yesterday. And I believe that a competent commission was set up. And with the help of this commission, we will resolve many questions you have, beginning with the law. We proceeded using the temporary regulation, from what? First of all, we proceeded from the fact that the law about security was adopted only in draft form [at first reading]. We proceeded from the fact that today with consideration of the criminal case which was investigated and with consideration of the material from the commission, that radical solutions are needed in creation of special services in the Ministry of Security. And by the way, I must say that this service was liquidated, and it is not in our structure. Although those speaking here before me said that the decision was made before this, the services did not exist, but the personnel remained, and they were transferred to various services. We will say that. That's how I can answer you.

G. P. Yakunin

And a second question. Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, the Chairman of the Supreme Soviet, Khasbulatov, reproaches our commission that we were almost like drones, drone-like, and that we are not doing anything. Nothing is heard of you anywhere in the press. And in some degree we needed to be put under this pressure, so to speak, to set up a constant flow of information concerning the Fifth Directorate (Directorate Z). We, the members of the commission, are convinced that this activity, certainly, was illegal and on this basis the KGB unleashed that very Fifth Service [sic] for suppressing spiritual life in an anti-constitutional way. Such a service must not exist in the new state. But we suggest using this information. I don't know how reliable it is, that concerning leaks in particular information, that you issued an order for an in-house investigation of the agents of the Fifth Directorate. Is that true or not?

V.P. Barannikov

No. That is not true. And I want to say that openly today at this hearing. If there are some questions about the ministry's activity, the ministry's doors are open, and I think that we don't have to play in secret today. Two tasks which are placed before the ministry today are defense of state security and defense of the citizen of Russia. There are two units which today are present, pending resolution of the matter of creating the ministry.

Chairman

Second microphone, please.

(Deputy who does not identify himself)

I want to repeat the question posed to Sergei Vadimovich. Who in the world came up with the idea of combining the two ministries? Isn't this a return to the 1930's? And you would be the primary interested person in this situation. Perhaps I don't understand it correctly? Specific people?

V.P. Barannikov

I will answer you. Development of the structure of the new combined ministry has been in progress since 1990. In November, 1991 there was a state soviet meeting where the decision was made whereby the two leaders of the authorities—the Union MVD and the Union Ministry of Security—were instructed to develop this structure. Then, as you know, the union structure was done away with. And the President then decided to create the structures. Two creation groups headed by the Russian Federation MVD worked on this. I am thinking of the structure which was already done away with, the union structure. That's how it was.

Chairman

Thank you. First microphone.

Beloborodov (199th District)

Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, you are on the Supreme Soviet Committee on Defense and Security and at its meeting, you said that you would support those good traditions which we worked out from the AFB and the Supreme Soviet. You know that we have a commission on personnel policy and that 26 supervisors of the regional organizations of the Agency for Federal Security have been named. These changes were done in connection with the fact that the former leaders directly or indirectly either misbehaved or took the wrong side during the putsch period.

At present I know that replacements are being made, and people are now being nominated as had been agreed. [They are being named] without the authority of the Supreme Soviet, and generally ignoring the Supreme Soviet [in the hiring process]. This is even though you said otherwise.

I also pricked up my ears at the fact that those officers, Capital-O Officers, who were the sources of the Russian AFB—that is Ivanenko, Podelyakin, and Yampolsky, who displayed civil courage both before the putsch and after it now have been fired. This again was done without the permission, without the agreement of the Supreme Soviet. This causes me to prick up my ears. And so I appeal to you with this question. Will you, as the leader of the authority, agree to the naming with the commission which has already worked out its tactics, and I think, that it is correct, and the deputies from the regions support me on this, in this commission there are representatives of many committees of the Supreme Soviet, representatives of regions, and how do you intend to deal further with these matters? What is your policy? Will you agree with the Supreme Soviet or not?

I asked the chairmen of committees in the United States Congress similar to ours what they do in relation to that leader of an authority who does not coordinate his actions, including personnel actions, with Congress. They say directly, "We don't give him any money." I am telling you the same thing directly. If you don't get your actions in line, and I don't like to threaten, Viktor Pavlovich, you know me, we will take the same course. And

specifically, you organized persecution of those persons who actively spoke at the Constitutional Court against amalgamation. As I see it, [by persecuting them] you are acting now against us.

V.P. Barannikov

I will answer that. First, I do not accept the claim that there is any sort of persecution going on in connection with those who spoke at the Constitutional Court. I would like to know the specific names of those who are taking this route and who is doing it. That's first.

Second, concerning naming personnel. I agree to the naming of the deputy ministers who were named by presidential decree. I agreed on them with the Chairman of the Defense Committee, then with the government, and then with the decree of the President.

Not a single leader was named personally by the minister, but was named at the collegium; each candidacy was officially designated at the collegium. If you think that those who were named are not appropriate for the position, I am prepared to look into the matter.

Chairman

All right. I would like anyway to support the deputy's question. This conversation is about a Supreme Soviet commission. Thus, you now say who was prepared.

V.P. Barannikov

You know that this decree was changed by presidential decree. Now a Supreme Soviet Presidium commission has been created. This commission will now work with us.

Chairman

Fifth microphone.

V.I. Belov (Tver)

Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, as I see it, state security organs in outlying areas have not changed in style nor in their working methods. In this connection, I have the following question for you. Does the informer network of the security organs still continue to be infiltrated into the democratic movement, and are false democratic structures still created for disruption of the democratic movement in outlying areas and to hinder the implementation of radical economic and political reforms? Do the security organs still keep dossiers on progressive public figures, including deputies?

V.P. Barannikov

Concerning dossiers. They said before me, and as far as I know on the basis of my 15 days in office, the dossiers are already burned, and this happened when the upset near Lubyanka took place. That's first.

Concerning security organs in outlying areas. I think that you have correctly stated the question. In my short term in office I visited five oblasts. We must resolve the personnel problem and the leadership of the directorates in the provinces, and we have today in those regions 12 leaders about whom we have to decide if we will fire them. If we don't solve this question, this will continue and will hinder the work. We have to completely

change the position right down to the bottom of the federal structure so that this apparatus would not be the same sort of appendage as it was. And comrade Lisov correctly stated that this is the CPSU Central Committee (that these structures were appended to). That's only one example. The service concerned with economic protection [was an appendage of] the Central Committee Industrial Department. The transportation directorate [was an appendage of] the Central Committee Transportation Department. That's how this service was set up.

Chairman

Viktor Pavlovich, a question just occurred to me. What is the fate of Ivanenko and Yampolskiy? Can we believe that their fate will be decided jointly with the parliamentary commission?

V.P. Barannikov

Certainly.

R.M. Akhunov

Viktor Pavlovich? In the list of tasks which the Ministry of Security will deal with, you mentioned territorial integrity. In some parliaments, for example, in Karelia, the question of seceding from Russia has come up. Question. Does this announcement of the parliaments enter into this sphere of tasks?

V.P. Barannikov

Such questions are coming up both in Karelia and in Tataria. I think that this is a political matter, and not a matter for the security service to decide who goes and who stays.

V.A. Rebrikov

Viktor Pavlovich, tell us please, what part did Ilyushin, Skokov, and Petrov play in the development and writing of the merger of the KGB and the MVD? And where do you plan to use General Komissarov in the future?

V.P. Barannikov

First, General Komissarov has no relation to our service at present.

Concerning Ilyushin, Petrov, and Skokov. Petrov and Skokov have no relation to this decree. And our representatives participated at Skokov's in formulating the law about the security of the Russian Federation and about the Ministry of Security. Those two documents.

Surkov

Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, as far as is known after you (after the putsch) assumed leadership of the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs, there were several former Secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee there. Furthermore, immediately after the putsch, you took as your Deputy for Personnel the former Chief of the Tambov UVD, Trubin, who in open text supported the GKChP.

In connection with this, I have a question for you and a general concern. What can we expect of the future Ministry of Security, and will it not be a

settling tank for those who yesterday, so to speak, oppressed Democratic Russia?

And another thing. Please answer that which Stepashin was unable to answer. Is there now any surveillance of the deputy corps, including members of the Russian Supreme Soviet?

V.P. Barannikov

I will answer the last question. As minister, I have no personal knowledge of it. I signed no such order, nor will I. And if it is made known to me [that such surveillance is going on], I will take firm measures [to stop it]. It is against the law.

Concerning the ministry's personnel. Today in the security service, about 50 percent of the personnel is made up of raion committee secretaries, of the Central Committee. This is by direction of the Central Committee. Picture this. These are employees who have worked in the party structure for 10-15 years and have worked for 15 years apiece in the security organs. Now this reforming is in progress. We can't groundlessly ask about what each individual did in the Central Committee or the raion committee or the Komsomol raion committee. I think that we have to sort this out. I asked yesterday when there was talk of this, that we sort this out together. And I am prepared to report to parliament about the end of it.

D.S. Bubyakhin (Member of the Supreme Soviet)

Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich. Recently information appeared in the media that there is an underground crossing from Lubyanka to the CPSU Central Committee Building, and there even are railroad lines to Stalin's dacha. Tell us, please, about the fate of these things. Are they to continue to serve the same purpose for which they were constructed?

Second, if not, then could you provide a tour of them for the deputies of the Russian Federation?

V.P. Barannikov

I apologize that I can't report on this matter today, since I have not myself used these underground passages and I don't know where they lead. I can't even tell you they exist. If this question arises then I will look into it in due course. But I don't know if such passageways exist.

Chairman

Viktor Pavlovich, there are now two written questions. Is there any data about specific people and organizations working toward reanimation of the GKChP? What is being done about them?

V.P. Barannikov

First, we have no information about reanimation of the GKChP, and we are not investigating it. Those who supported the GKChP are surrounded. They are known to us. That's how I can answer that question.

Chairman

One more question. Distinguished Viktor Pavlovich, please give us your evaluation about the fact that during today's parliamentary hearings you

repeated the figures which were provided to journalists by Army [sic] General Kryuchkov.

V.P. Barannikov

I gave you statistical figures. I don't know where Kryuchkov provided them, but "they" [unspecified] did not provide these figures.

From the floor

(Transcriber couldn't hear the question.)

V.P. Barannikov

In the first place, I didn't know that Kryuchkov had repeated them to the correspondents when he met with them. That's the first thing. In the second place, I want to repeat my answer to you. I would ask that the commission which the Presidium named today should be supported also by parliament, and together with the leadership of [my] ministry should be tasked to look into all details of this ministry. And then there will be no room for question about whether surveillance is or is not possible. I have in mind the adoption of a package of laws which do not exist today. Now we have five thousand orders, decrees, and instructions in the ministry which was created, and none of them were done on the basis of law, but are internal documents. And they must be based on law. Then the parliament justly can ask from anyone, starting with the minister, about how he is complying with the law. But today there is not a single law. Therefore, I ask again that those draft laws which are now located in the Supreme Soviet be adopted as quickly as possible. These laws must be worked up, so let's work them up. The laws today are needed for all employees. These laws are needed today by our whole nation.

Chairman

Viktor Pavlovich, here's the final question and a proposal from the Supreme Soviet Committee. You understand that adopting laws is a lengthy process, although we are trying to make them quickly. But at the hearings today we discovered that nobody can assure us that there is no monitoring, surveillance, and so on. Therefore, we have a specific proposal. In the course of a week the Supreme Soviet committees will take upon themselves the obligation to create technical services. Are you prepared to cooperate with these technical services and with parliament so that within a week you can establish control over monitoring, over surveillance, and so on, and so on?

V.P. Barannikov

Certainly. Please.

Chairman

Thank you. Please, Yevgeny Maximovich Primakov, Director of the Foreign Intelligence Service.

[Editor's note: Director General Primakov's testimony will appear in the Winter 1996 issue of DEMOKRATIZATSIYA. The issue will also include testimony of the KGB's last chairman, Vadim Bakatin; and parliamentary

commission investigators and outside experts. The Spring 1996 issue will contain the text of the 10 February 1992 hearings "Concerning the Financial Dealings of the CPSU."}